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Abstract
We suggest a system of monitoring special nuclear material inventories which uses simple
mathematical techniques to compare the gross features of emitted gamma-ray spectra.  In this report
we develop the techniques necessary to make such spectral comparisons and  describe their
application.  We also apply these ideas and develop inventory confirmation results using a room-
temperature CdTe detector in a real nuclear-material inventory environment.
Introduction
The verification of special nuclear materials (SNM) continues to be a challenging
problem.  Prior to storage, materials must undergo some form of characterization to
insure that they can be later located and accounted for. Material characterization can
involve either a destructive assay or a non-destructive assay.  A destructive assay
requires that a representative sample of the material is extracted and analyzed while a
non -destructive assay often uses the discrete “peak” components of the emitted gamma-
radiation flux for characterization and quantification.
After a sample undergoes assay, and if no further processing is required, the material is
labeled, packaged and finally stored in a suitably secured repository.  The destructive
and/or non-destructive gamma-ray assay results, along with other physical parameters
unique to the material (i.e. weight, storage container identification features, chemical
composition, etc.), are then entered into a file and these make up the permanent record of
the material during its residence in the repository.  A number of such items compose a
special nuclear material inventory and this collection must be regularly surveyed to
insure that the material remains as it was stored and has not been diverted by accident or
for malicious intent.
Typical inventory surveys involve simple protocols such as checking the integrity of
tamper-proof seals, re-weighing the object and a rudimentary gamma-ray assay.  The
latter may be semi-quantitative in the sense that selected spectral regions are checked to
insure that a signal exists which is consistent with the SNM catalogued.  Specifically,
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2this means that the spectrum is surveyed for individual peaks and their magnitude
quantified.  From these data a judgment is then made as to whether the peaks observed
are consistent with the registry of the inventory item. Additional checks of the entire
spectrum may also be made by a human observer to insure that the current spectrum has
features which resemble those from the original gamma-ray assay.
The current technology for SNM high-resolution gamma-ray assays involves germanium
detectors that must be cooled to cryogenic temperatures by liquid nitrogen.  These
devices are generally not portable and carry with them significant infrastructure costs.
However, even with the use of such high-resolution systems, inventory verification can
be complicated by background effects and because the measurements must be corrected
for container thickness to get useful results.  If the container thickness is significant, the
usefulness of a high-resolution system is degraded because the container wall will
absorb the peaks of interest.  Inventory checks are also done with low resolution NaI
detector systems that can operate at room temperature and which are portable.  In using
such systems, a compromise is struck between ease of use and the information obtained.
For such systems, the resolution is generally insufficient to resolve peaks of interest and
one is reduced to simply recording enhanced count rates in spectral regions that are
expected to display the SNM gamma-ray signal.
In the present report, we describe a new SNM inventory verification protocol that uses
the emerging technology of CdTe and CdZnTe crystals as gamma-ray detectors.  This
“Confirmatory Protocol” makes uses of a simple analysis of gamma-ray spectrum taken
with these detectors.  The combination of the hardware and software described here can
likely grow in sophistication but the ideas are simple, easy to understand and, it is hoped,
easy to be accepted by the Nuclear Safeguard community.
Information Content of Spectra
A measured gamma ray spectrum is a discrete distribution that graphs the number of
gamma-ray photons detected as a function of energy.  That is,
† 
yi = f x i( ) 1( )
where yi is the number of photons recorded in channel position xi and where the xi can be
instrumentally adjusted to be linear in photon energy:
† 
E = a xi + b .
The spectrum yi is characterized by a series of very narrow, nearly Gaussian peaks
resting on a continuum that resembles a broad but skewed Gaussian distribution.
Detailed information about the radiation emitter is contained in the sharp peaks while
information about the source environment and its physical composition resides primarily
3in the continuum.   The continuum also possesses information about how gamma rays
interact with the detector.
Spectrum-stripping algorithms have been developed that find, identify and, when close-
lying multiplets are encountered, deconvolute the sharp Gaussian peaks.  Combined with
suitable calibration techniques, a stripping analysis provides accurate assays of
radioisotope materials.  Ideally, best results are obtained when the radiation detector
provides good differentiation between events (i.e. good energy resolution) and when the
spectrum has been accumulated for a sufficiently long time.  Both factors serve to
enhance “signal to noise ratios” and provide peaks with good statistics – i.e. peaks that
protrude well above the broad continuum.  Factors that inhibit and distort this sort of
analyses are thick-walled containers; radioisotopic materials that are packaged as dense,
inhomogeneous, metallic forms; measurement systems that provide poor energy
resolution; circumstances that require short-duration count times, etc.  In these cases,
peak structure can be perturbed or “washed out” and the resulting analysis is rendered
inaccurate and/or non-reproducible.
While a deconvolution analysis is always the method of choice when circumstances
allow and when the most detailed information is required, in many cases, the analysis is
overly complicated for the question asked.  Such a situation arises in inventory control.
In most cases the question is simply: “Does storage container A contain the same
material in the same amount today as it did yesterday?  As it did last week?  As it did
last month?”  In this report, we show that this question can be answered faithfully by a
simple and straight-forward protocol that compares spectra taken from the same
container at different times.
Operational Assumptions
The comparison of two spectra, taken from the same container at different times, can
faithfully identify disturbed and undisturbed containers but this procedure is not
designed to extract detailed information about inventory items.  In other words, a
spectrum comparison provides a yes-no or go-nogo decision option.  Once a disturbed
situation is identified, other procedures and /or protocols would be used to identify
whether a theft or diversion has occurred and the magnitude of the quantity involved.
The primary operational assumption of the new protocol is that, all other things being
equal, any packaged radioactive sample emits a gamma-radiation signature that
combines effects due to the following:
(1) the chemical form of the material
(2) the radioisotopic content of the material
(3) the physical mass of the material
(4) how the material is packaged
(5) the variety of substances used to package the material.
4Given the above, an associated corollary is that the details of the radiation field outside
any packaged radioactive sample is absolutely unique because no two such radioactive
packages are exactly alike in every way.  The final assumption is that technology is
available which can accurately and reliably sample a container’s gamma-radiation field
and that this measured radiation profile can be used to consistently identify one package
to the exclusion of all others at any time.
The new protocol described here will neither identify individual peaks nor make specific
isotopic identifications.  It is assumed that such detailed measurements are done outside
the confirmation protocol structure.  That is, a sample’s “isotopics”, along with its other
physical or administrative attributes, are independently determined and filed in the
primary control file.  Subsequent radiation measurements – i.e. “confirmatory
measurements” - do not have to be at a high level of specific detail to confirm that the
item remains in the inventory undisturbed.
After the material is packaged and after the detailed “isotopics of the sample” have been
determined and recorded, an additional measurement of the sample’s radiation field is
made using a lower resolution portable system.  This “fiducial” spectrum represents the
totality of the sample’s exterior radiation field and represents the initial “fingerprint” of
the sample.  A second measurement of the sample’s radiation field will be made at a
later time.  The sample is considered undisturbed when the second spectrum is judged
identical to the stored “fiducial” spectrum.
The assumptions above represent ideal constructs that must be modified in practice.
First, because every radioactive sample possesses and intrinsic half-life, the radiation
field will vary with time.  Table 1 presents a partial list of controlled nuclear materials
and their characteristic half lives.
Table 1: Partial Summary of Controlled Nuclear Materials
Controlled
Radioisotope
Half-life [yrs.] S i x - m o n t h  d e c a y
fraction
235 U 7.038 E08 <1 E-10
236Np 1.150 E05 3.0 E-06
237Np 2.140 E06 1.6 E-07
238Pu 8.774 E01 3.9 E-03
239Pu 2.413 E04 1.4 E-05
240Pu 6.537 E03 5.3 E-05
241Pu 1.516 E01 2.3 E-02
242Pu 3.869 E05 9.0 E-07
5The table shows that if confirmatory measurements of the above materials are performed
within a six-month window, the decay characteristics of the material will not
substantially alter the measured radiation field. From the above data, the worst case is
241Pu where the short half-life can be expected to contribute ~ 2.3% error when
comparing spectra from the same source over a 6 month interval.  For short half-life
samples (< 50 – 100 yrs.), errors introduced because of radioactive decay can be reduced
by making confirmatory measurements at shorter intervals.
A second practical consideration is reproducing the source-detector geometry between
measurements1.  There are two aspects to this problem:
(1) When the source in the container has not been disturbed, the detector must be
identically positioned relative to the container for subsequent confirmatory
measurements.
(2) When the stored material is likely to be disturbed because the container is to be
opened or the storage container is handled in such a way as to increase the
probability that the original orientation of the sample might be changed, a “before
move” and an “after move” measurement must be made.
The first case represents an engineering problem that can be solved by constructing a
suitable detector stand that positions the detector at the same location relative to the
packaged material.  The second case can be solved by administrative controls.  If a
container is to be moved and if the sample will be disturbed, then an inventory
confirmation measurement must be made before the sample is removed from the
repository and a new fiducial measurement made after it is returned to storage.
A third problem involves background interferences. At the present time and without
more detailed data, it is unclear how background will perturb the confirmatory spectral
measurements suggested here.  However, initial data suggest that, as long as a container
undergoing measurement delivers an overwhelmingly strong radiation signal, the vault
background may not be a serious interference and need not be accounted for.  A small
[2mm x 2mm x 1mm] CdTe detector was used for initial proof-of- principle studies and
we found that the vault background had little effect on the results.   Our data suggest
that, by using a suitably shielded detector, confirmatory measurements may be
performed without removing the container from its shelf location in the storage facility.
A more prudent setup for confirmation measurements, however, might involve building
a mobile stand that can reside in one corner of a storage vault.  When confirmation
measurements are requested, sealed cans are removed from their shelf location and
reproducibly positioned on the assembly.  The mobile stand has a shielded mount to
accept the detector probe and to position it reproducibly relative to the container.  After
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6the measurement operations are complete, the assembly can be wheeled out and stored in
another location.
The last problem involves instrument limitations.  These require that special care be
exercised in selecting and using devices that will be employed for inventory
confirmation applications.  Since the confirmation protocol will rely on comparison
measurements of the integrated radiation profile from a source, a calibration procedure
must be developed that will insure that such comparisons are done with confidence.  In
principle, this is an engineering problem that can be solved with suitably designed
hardware.   The hardware should be easily “tunable” so that an instrument can be
adjusted to deliver a consistent response to a standard radiation source.  Finally, applying
the hardware in the proper way can be handled with administrative controls and well-
written procedures.  Ideally, instrument adjustments and measurements would be
designed so that minimally trained personnel could carry out the confirmation protocols.
The detector and electronics envisioned for the new confirmation measurements
combines a small room-temperature detector with a miniature multi-channel analyzer.
The unit is intrinsically portable and can be stored in a desk drawer.
Theoretical Discussion
The comparison of two gamma-ray spectra can be done easily by comparing the
amplitudes provided by either a wavelet or a Fourier decomposition procedure.  Wavelet
decomposition, for example, is used in communications applications where it is
necessary to reduce the complex structure in a signal (i.e. voice, video, etc.) to its most
basic features.  These features are then transmitted to a receiver where a faithful copy of
the original is reconstructed.  Wavelet decomposition has proven to be a good procedure
to reduce information quantity without loss of information content.  Therefore, it
provides a truncated but faithful basis on which two spectra (signals) can be compared.
While detailed decomposition techniques are faithful bases for spectrum comparisons, it
remains to be seen whether they are necessary for the application described in the
present report.  An alternate way to look at the problem is to extract simple “descriptors”
or “comparators” from a spectrum and then use these as a comparison basis. We define a
descriptor/comparator2 as some number extracted from a spectrum that is meaningfully
associated with that spectrum.3  To make the definition finer, we define a “unique
descriptor” as a quantity associated with one spectrum to the exclusion of all others.
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3 As defined here descriptor/comparator is more general than an alternate term that might be associated
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7We can arbitrarily subdivide descriptors into two classes:  “Gross descriptors” and
“discrete descriptors”.  The former captures elements of a spectrum that have an average
or “total” quality about them.  Examples include the simple average of all the data or
some measure of the various symmetries or asymmetries that might exist.  Discrete
descriptors capture local features in a spectrum.  These include sharp features such as
individual gamma-ray peaks or Compton-scattering cut-offs.  In general, because of
statistical fluctuations in the measured data, no descriptor will be unique.  That is, within
experimental error, if two spectra have the same single descriptor, they are not
necessarily obtained from the same sample.  However, as we increase the number of
different descriptors, it will be progressively unlikely that two different spectra will
exhibit the same set of descriptors.  In this document, we suggest that a set of six
descriptors can be identified that allow for a credible basis for comparing spectra.  In the
discussion that follows, we present these ideas in more rigorous detail.
We start by noting that the distribution described in Eqn. (1) can be normalized to time4
and transformed into a probability distribution.  Thus, take
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where  Y(xi)  now has the properties of a probability density distribution with xi as the
random variable.  That is
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usually cancel out.   We include the time parameter to avoid confusion and to emphasize that
comparing counts per unit time on a channel by channel basis is the proper way to compare gamma ray
spectra given the experimental conditions assumed in this report.  However, this is not true when count
rates or measures of count rate are compared.
8so that P(xi) is the probability that an event is registered in xi per unit time.  The
moment-generating function of a discrete random variable xi is given by5
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where mi are the moments of the probability distribution described by Eqn. (4) and w  is
an arbitrary parameter.  The individual moments are given by
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Consider a second probability density distribution  (spectrum) Z(xi) normalized to time
 t¢ , where in general, t ≠ t¢, then
Y(xi)  = Z(xi),
if and only if
)6(mm mm ¢=
for all m, where  
† 
mm , ¢ m m   are the moments of Y(xi) and Z(xi), respectively.  That is to say
that we can compare two distributions through their moments.  Or, said another way, the
moments extracted from two spectra are gross descriptors and when compared, provide
some measure of the similarity or dissimilarity of two spectra.
Identifying a set of discrete descriptors from a spectrum is less straight-forward than
extracting the moments of a spectral distribution.  Excluding low order wavelet or
Fourier decomposition amplitudes, a simpler set of discrete descriptors might include the
ratio of the spectrum area to its perimeter, the spectrum’s fractal dimension, etc.  For the
present discussion, we evaluate the following simple discrete descriptor which is based
on looking at a spectrum in a somewhat different way.  We also obtain an additional
gross descriptor from the analysis.
Without any loss of information, we rewrite Eqn. (2) as a multidimensional vector thus,
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In other words, the unit vectors derived from the two spectral vectors must be collinear
(i.e. their inner product = 1) and, the overall magnitude of the vectors must be equal.
Eqns. (6) and Eqns. (10) are a set of  m + 2 comparators that can be used to compare
spectra.  As a working hypothesis, we take six comparators from this set and claim that
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they provide a sufficient basis on which to compare spectra.  For example, the first three
moments of the distribution represented by Eqn. (4), are the distribution’s centroid, a
measure of its width, and the  measure of its asymmetry.6  Eqns. (10) are a direct
measure of the channel-by-channel similarities as well as a relative measure of total
count rate.7
Once the six descriptors are calculated for two spectra, we compare them as ratios and
determine their proximity to unity.  That is, in an ideal case, the individual ratios of the
descriptors will be unity and any measure of their proximity to unity will be zero.  More
precisely, let
i
i
i d
dR ¢=
where d  is an arbitrary descriptor calculated from two spectra measured from the same
item but where one spectrum was accumulated for time t and the other for time t¢.
Ideally, Ri = 1 but, because of measurement error, in general, Ri ≠ 1 but ought to be close
to it.  Thus, we expect that
011 ª¢-=-=D i
i
ii d
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is a measure of that proximity.  For the entire set of six descriptors, we calculate
( )11
6
5
2ÂD
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Eqn. (11) represents the standard deviation of how well the descriptors line up with
unity.  Ideally, d = 0 but, for the present study, we arbitrarily set the level at d £ 0.1.
From the comparisons, performed here, this turns out to be a very stringent criterion.
Given reasonable measurement statistics, the probability that the six quantities defined
by Eqns. (6) and  Eqns. (8) will be the same for two different samples is sufficiently
small so that items can be reliably distinguished.  However, even if the protocol cannot
confidently distinguish between two different containers, such a chance occurrence will
also be difficult to separate by other techniques based on gamma-ray spectrum analysis
techniques.  Nevertheless, this should not invalidate the protocol because alternate
physical or administrative means may be used to make a differentiation.  In summary,
                                                 
6 We emphasize that all moments for the present application are taken with respect to the spectrum
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"variance" of the distribution.
7 The total count rate is, of course, given by Eqn. (3).   
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for the majority of the inventory items, we claim that an automated procedure based on
the ideas of gross and discrete descriptors can vastly reduce the human interaction with
confirmatory measurements.
Measurement Hardware
The prototype system used an AMP-TEK Corporation8 “ROVER” unit (Figure 1) with
an electrically cooled CdTe detector crystal (2mm x 2mm x 1mm) to measure the
radiation fields around a set of selected source materials. Because the crystals are small,
they are significantly less sensitive relative to liquid-nitrogen-cooled Ge systems or to
room-temperature NaI systems.  Nevertheless, for the application described here, low
sensitivity may be an advantage.
The ROVER is a self-contained, portable multi-channel analyzer radiation-detection
system.  It contains electronics for cooling the CdTe crystal and is fitted with a Hewlet-
Packard 200LX pocket computer for data accumulation and low-level instrument
control, data analysis and data storage.  The unit weighs ~ 2lbs and is hand held.  In the
present studies, the data were taken and stored on the ROVER unit and analyzed off line
on a lap-top personal computer (PC).  A special computer program was written to sort
through the data and to make the spectrum comparisons outlined in the previous section
– i.e. the “confirmatory measurements”.  The code is written in Microsoft FORTRAN.
In principle, the process could be modified so that all operations are performed on the
ROVER-attached pocket PC.  For the present, it seemed more appropriate to accumulate
the data in the ROVER unit and transfer it
for later analysis to a PC.  In a real
environment where inventory confirmations
are being carried out, it would likely be the
case that a two-computer protocol would be
more sensible and would better satisfy
security concerns.  That is, data would be
first accumulated with the ROVER unit by a
storage-vault worker.  Then, after data
accumulation, a second operator would
accept the flash-memory card from the
accumulation system and transport it to
another computer.  The second computer
would be connected to the inventory data
base and have direct read-only access to it.
The confirmatory checks would then be run
independent of the accumulation function.  A
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Figure 1: The Rover Unit used in the
confirmation measurements
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suggested operational flow chart, which organizes the process control, is offered in
Figure 2.
Description of the Prototype Measurements
The ROVER device was used to exercise a “Confirmation Test Protocol” to test the
confirmation technique.  Table II summarizes important details of the materials that were
selected for this study.
Table II lists a random selection of miscellaneous radioisotope calibration materials as
well as a series of samples that were controlled inventory materials.  The calibration
materials were radioactive sources that are easily handled and easy to use in a radiation-
measurement laboratory environment, i.e. the sources were simply packaged and could
be identified as “hand-held” and/or “hand-portable”. These included a lantern mantel
which contains naturally radioactive 232Th (1.4 x 1010 yr) sealed in a plastic wrapper, an
evaporated drop of 152Eu (13 yr) solution sealed between two plastic sheets and mounted
on an 3cm diameter aluminum ring, a series of four 235U (7.0 x 108 y) oxide standard
sources sealed in ~ 3” x 3” diameter stainless steel cans, a standard (“PIDI”) 239Pu (2.4 x
104 y) source encapsulated in a ~ 1” x  1” stainless-steel plug and a small ~ 1cm x 1cm
rectangular plastic-encapsulated source of 57Co (270 d).  The measurement of these
13
sources was performed under controlled conditions and in a low background
environment.  The detector was fixed on a stationary laboratory bench and a ring stand
held the radioactive source.   The source could then be moved relative to the detector and
positioned in a controlled way.
The special nuclear material inventory items were measured during a one-hour limited
access visit to a controlled nuclear-material vault.  The sources were a series of nine
metal cans (identified in Table II, Column 3 by a “Vault” prefix) that are designed for
special nuclear-material storage.  The selection of cans was purely random but there was
an attempt to insure that the selection provided a realistic profile of the materials stored
in the vault.
From both sets of measurements, a fictitious sample library was constructed which
provided the data base against which subsequent new spectra could be checked.  Table
II, Column 3, is identified as that data base.
In the process of compiling the library, a number of samples were measured a second
Table II: Inventory Control tests
Description 
General Date Spectrum ID  Comments
Count Time 
[sec]
Laboratory 11/8/02 CO71108B Co 57 Source 620.80
Test CO601108 Co 57 Source 305.00
Samples U23519A 1.9% 235 U source 7431.80
U23545A 4.5% 235 U source 4981.50
Controlled U23545B 4.5% 235 U source 7554.70
Environment U23587A 2.9% 235 U source 81030.80
MAN1107A Lantern Mantel 70618.00
Misc MANT0918 Lantern Mantel 96891.00
Calibration MANT0919 Lantern Mantel 84801.00
Materials MANT0920 Lantern Mantel 141176.00
 EUCAL Eu Calibration Source 173818.00
11/11/02 MAN1111A Lantern Mantel 246332.11
U235295B 2.9% 235U source 10675.00
U23529C 2.9% 235U source with stainless absorber 65050.90
U23529D 2.9% 235U w/o stainless absorber 12683.55
 PUS1112A PIDI Standard short count/1.5" thick paraffin 649.31
11/12/02 PUS1112B PIDI standard longer count/1.5" thick paraffin 6613.81
 11/13/02 PUS1113A PIDI Standard/ paraffin is 1 7/8" thick 58725.55
 11/13/02 PUS1113B
PIDI Standard/ same as above/but paraffin is 1.5 
" thick 9808.29
Inventory 11/13/02 Vault01 unmarked vault item 320.45
Items Vault02 " 134.95
Vault03 " 243.21
Storage Vault04 " 166.95
Vault Vault05 " 288.6
Environment Vault06 " 60.33
Vault07 " 235.71
Controlled Vault08 " 218.13
Special Vault09 " 129.01
Nuclear Vault10 " 150.93
Materials Vault11 " 142.29
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time.  These “repeat” measurements were used to query the library to mimic how a
confirmation measurement would be done.  Under these conditions, it was always
possible for the computer program to identify a source in the library.  Once an initial
spectrum from a source was accumulated and placed into the library, it was always
possible to make a second measurement and unambiguously identify that source as being
in the library.
Measurement Results
Table III A, B, C  and Table IV summarize some of  the results of the “confirmation
measurements”.  Figures 3A, B and C and Figure 4 display the spectra compared in
Tables III – IV.  The measurement conditions (i.e. source-detector distance, position in
the vault, etc.) associated with each spectrum in the library was identified and recorded
so that when the sample was remeasured, the experimental conditions could be repeated.
In table IIIA, a lantern mantle was measured under a repeatable condition.  That is, the
source-detector separation was reproduced but the counting time was arbitrary.  The
spectrum was then compared with the library list and the “final comparator” calculated.
Figure IIIA shows the two spectra as appearing nearly identical. The Table IIIA clearly
shows that the source is unambiguously identified, i.e. the final comparator is very small.
Table IIIA
Match exists
if Final 
Queried Spectrum Mant0920.mca 141176.00 Sec Comparator
< ~0.10
Data Base 
Spectrum
First 
Moment
Second 
Moment
Third 
Moment
Fourth 
Moment
Inner 
Product
Count 
Rate
Final 
Comparator
   pus1112a.mca 2.22 5.45 13.41 17.16 20.00 20.00 13.89
   mant0918.mca 1.43 4.26 15.19 20.00 1.34 1.27 9.78
   mant0919.mca 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.00 1.00 0.00
   eucal1.mca  1.18 2.10 5.31 15.34 1.73 14.94 8.37
   co71108b.asc 1.20 1.58 2.48 4.49 2.60 20.00 7.94
   co601108.asc 1.19 1.57 2.42 3.86 2.63 20.00 7.90
   u23519a.asc 1.17 1.08 1.50 3.40 1.62 20.00 7.83
   u23545a.asc 1.17 1.14 1.25 2.60 1.63 20.00 7.79
   u23545b.asc 1.17 1.14 1.25 2.62 1.64 20.00 7.79
   u23587a.asc 1.17 1.12 1.36 2.99 1.63 20.00 7.81
   man1107a.asc 1.01 1.99 6.03 20.00 1.18 3.07 8.08
   man1111a.asc 1.03 1.84 5.46 17.98 1.21 2.96 7.22
   u235295b.asc 1.18 1.13 1.34 2.93 1.63 20.00 7.80
   u23529C.asc 1.13 1.04 1.47 3.18 1.58 20.00 7.81
   u23529D.asc 1.18 1.12 1.36 2.98 1.63 20.00 7.81
   pus1112b.mxx 2.22 5.49 14.36 20.00 20.00 20.00 14.62
   pu1113ax.mca 2.23 5.53 14.40 20.00 20.00 20.00 14.63
   pu1113bx.mca 2.24 5.55 14.53 20.00 20.00 20.00 14.65
   vault01x.mca 1.01 1.18 1.63 2.77 1.50 20.00 7.80
   vault02x.mca 2.00 3.76 5.13 3.80 20.00 20.00 11.22
   vault03x.mca 1.13 1.12 1.04 1.50 1.44 20.00 7.76
   vault04x.mca 1.58 1.96 1.82 1.28 5.90 20.00 8.03
   vault05x.mca 1.40 1.56 1.27 1.45 2.85 20.00 7.80
   vault06x.mca 2.09 4.70 9.82 11.98 20.00 20.00 12.49
   vault07x.mca 1.13 1.23 2.73 7.82 2.33 20.00 8.29
   vault08x.mca 1.33 1.39 1.08 1.72 2.65 20.00 7.79
   vault09x.mca 1.36 1.42 1.11 1.58 2.44 20.00 7.79
   vault10x.mca 1.01 1.17 1.56 2.40 1.53 20.00 7.78
   vault11x.mca 2.04 4.26 7.46 7.78 20.00 20.00 11.70
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Table IIIB and Figure 3B show a similar comparison for two enriched uranium samples.
The small comparator shown in Table IIIB indicates clearly that the code easily selected
the proper uranium sample from the library.  The sample selected, U23545A, is enriched
in 235U to ~ 4.5%.  Other similarly packaged sources in the library are enriched to 2.9%,
and 1.9%, and these  - quite appropriately - were not selected as a match. Figure 3B also
shows the spectrum for the uranium sample enriched in 235U to 2.9%.  Although this
spectrum (U23529C) is very similar to the spectrum from the sample enriched to 4.5%
(U23545A and U23545B), its final comparator (0.27) did not fall in the range where it
would be considered a match.
The measurements in the storage vault were limited in time, so the spectrum
accumulation times were necessarily short, i.e.  generally < 5min.  Storage cans were
identified at random, removed from the storage shelf and, in most cases, simply
measured with the can on the floor directly below the actual storage-shelf location. Table
IIIC shows that a duplicate measurement on the sample labeled Vault01X was correctly
identified.  For comparison in Figure 3C, the spectra Vault04X and its associated
comparator (2.36) is also displayed and shows that this item can be easily discriminated
from the material represented by the spectra labeled Vault01X and Vault10X.
Table IIIB
Match exists
if Final
Queried Spectrum U23545b.asc 7554.70 SEC Comparator
< ~0.10
Data Base 
Spectrum
First 
Moment
Second 
Moment
Third 
Moment
Fourth 
Moment
Inner 
Product Count Rate
Final 
Comparator
pus1112a.mca 1.89 4.76 16.81 20 6.83 20 13.04
mant0918.mca 1.67 4.86 12.12 19.99 1.72 20 11.98
mant0919.mca 1.17 1.15 1.25 2.6 1.64 20 7.79
mant0920.mca 1.17 1.14 1.25 2.62 1.64 20 7.79
eucal1.mca 1.38 2.4 4.23 5.86 1.44 4.52 2.85
co71108b.asc 1.02 1.38 3.11 11.76 2.36 7.23 5.18
co601108.asc 1.02 1.38 3.03 10.1 2.38 7.41 4.66
u23519a.asc 1 1.06 1.19 1.3 1.01 1.46 0.24
u23545a.asc 1 1 1.01 1.01 1 1.03 0.01
u23587a.asc 1 1.03 1.09 1.14 1 1.25 0.12
man1107a.asc 1.18 2.28 4.81 7.65 1.5 20 8.38
man1111a.asc 1.14 2.1 4.36 6.87 1.4 20 8.25
u235295b.asc 1.01 1.01 1.07 1.12 1.01 1.24 0.11
u23529C.asc 1.04 1.1 1.17 1.21 1.01 1.59 0.27
u23529D.asc 1.01 1.02 1.08 1.14 1.01 1.23 0.12
pus1112b.mxx 1.9 4.8 18 20 6.83 20 13.29
pu1113ax.mca 1.91 4.84 18.05 20 6.7 20 13.3
pu1113bx.mca 1.91 4.86 18.22 20 6.76 20 13.34
vault01x.mca 1.16 1.35 1.3 1.06 1.2 5.3 1.77
vault02x.mca 1.71 3.29 6.43 9.95 5.8 20 9.12
vault03x.mca 1.03 1.02 1.21 1.74 1.1 6.35 2.21
vault04x.mca 1.35 1.71 2.29 3.35 2.55 20 7.87
vault05x.mca 1.2 1.37 1.6 1.81 1.69 5.08 1.75
vault06x.mca 1.79 4.12 12.31 20 6.7 20 12.2
vault07x.mca 1.03 1.41 2.18 2.99 1.53 3.33 1.37
vault08x.mca 1.14 1.22 1.35 1.53 1.61 3.39 1.05
vault09x.mca 1.16 1.24 1.39 1.65 1.63 2.8 0.85
vault10x.mca 1.16 1.33 1.24 1.09 1.21 5.3 1.77
vault11x.mca 1.75 3.72 9.35 20 6.08 20 11.73
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Table IIIC
Match exists
if Final 
Queried Spectrum Vault10x.mca 150.93 SEC Comparator
< ~0.10
Data Base 
Spectrum
First 
Moment
Second 
Moment
Third 
Moment
Fourth 
Moment
Inner 
Product
Count 
Rate
Final 
Comparator
   pus1112a.mca 2.19 6.34 20.00 20.00 4.47 7.92 11.63
   mant0918.mca 1.45 3.65 9.77 20.00 1.49 20.00 11.59
   mant0919.mca 1.01 1.16 1.55 2.39 1.53 20.00 7.78
   mant0920.mca 1.01 1.17 1.56 2.40 1.53 20.00 7.78
   eucal1.mca  1.19 1.80 3.41 6.38 1.21 20.00 8.13
   co71108b.asc 1.18 1.84 3.86 10.79 1.85 1.36 4.20
   co601108.asc 1.18 1.83 3.76 9.27 1.88 1.40 3.60
   u23519a.asc 1.16 1.25 1.04 1.41 1.20 7.75 2.77
   u23545a.asc 1.16 1.33 1.25 1.08 1.21 5.46 1.83
   u23545b.asc 1.16 1.33 1.24 1.09 1.21 5.30 1.77
   u23587a.asc 1.16 1.30 1.14 1.25 1.21 6.63 2.31
   man1107a.asc 1.02 1.71 3.88 8.34 1.33 20.00 8.40
   man1111a.asc 1.02 1.58 3.51 7.48 1.24 20.00 8.26
   u235295b.asc 1.17 1.31 1.16 1.22 1.20 6.57 2.28
   u23529C.asc 1.11 1.21 1.06 1.32 1.19 8.44 3.04
   u23529D.asc 1.17 1.31 1.14 1.24 1.20 6.54 2.27
   pus1112b.mxx 2.20 6.39 20.00 20.00 4.40 7.89 11.63
   pu1113ax.mca 2.21 6.44 20.00 20.00 4.15 5.27 11.41
   pu1113bx.mca 2.21 6.47 20.00 20.00 4.14 7.54 11.59
   vault01x.mca 1.00 1.01 1.05 1.15 1.03 1.00 0.07
   vault02x.mca 1.98 4.38 7.98 9.13 4.01 20.00 9.10
   vault03x.mca 1.12 1.31 1.50 1.60 1.08 1.20 0.36
   vault04x.mca 1.56 2.28 2.83 3.07 1.97 5.79 2.36
   vault05x.mca 1.38 1.82 1.98 1.66 1.41 1.04 0.63
   vault06x.mca 2.07 5.48 15.27 20.00 4.39 20.00 12.64
   vault07x.mca 1.12 1.06 1.76 3.25 1.25 1.59 1.01
   vault08x.mca 1.32 1.62 1.68 1.40 1.35 1.56 0.51
   vault09x.mca 1.35 1.65 1.72 1.52 1.35 1.89 0.61
   vault11x.mca 2.02 4.96 11.59 18.70 4.06 20.00 11.64
Table IV and Figure 4 represents a close match between two vault items that are not
identical. Based on the calculated comparator (0.28), the code correctly rejects the
sample as a true match.  But under real conditions, this situation might warrant an
additional administrative and/or physical check. because the spectra appear virtually
identical in almost every detail.  The point of such a comparison is that in this situation,
it is likely that even if an analysis of the spectrum is based on a peak stripping algorithm,
it would show that, within experimental error, the isotopic content of both cans is nearly
the same.  Here again, administrative and/or physical controls would be expected to
yield additional comparators which would allow proper differentiation of the samples.
Finally, Figure 5 shows a random comparison of spectra from some of the other items in
the vault.  This comparison shows that there is a wide range of comparators in the
inventory items.
Summary
A system of monitoring special nuclear material inventories is suggested which uses
simple mathematical techniques to compare the features of emitted gamma-ray spectra.
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Table IV
Match exists
if Final 
Queried Spectrum Vault11x.mca 142.29 SEC Comparator
< ~0.10
Data Base 
Spectrum
First 
Moment
Second 
Moment
Third 
Moment
Fourth 
Moment
Inner 
Product Count Rate
Final 
Comparator
   pus1112a.mca 1.09 1.28 1.80 2.21 1.04 20.00 7.78
   mant0918.mca 2.92 18.10 20.00 20.00 6.07 20.00 15.30
   mant0919.mca 2.04 4.27 7.49 7.83 20.00 20.00 11.71
   mant0920.mca 2.04 4.26 7.46 7.78 20.00 20.00 11.70
   eucal1.mca  2.41 8.94 20.00 20.00 7.27 20.00 14.07
   co71108b.asc 1.71 2.69 3.00 1.73 13.47 20.00 9.35
   co601108.asc 1.71 2.70 3.08 2.02 14.73 20.00 9.65
   u23519a.asc 1.75 3.95 11.15 20.00 5.53 20.00 11.94
   u23545a.asc 1.75 3.72 9.30 20.00 6.03 20.00 11.72
   u23545b.asc 1.75 3.72 9.35 20.00 6.08 20.00 11.73
   u23587a.asc 1.74 3.81 10.16 20.00 5.74 20.00 11.81
   man1107a.asc 2.06 8.48 20.00 20.00 5.55 20.00 13.91
   man1111a.asc 1.98 7.83 20.00 20.00 4.53 20.00 13.80
   u235295b.asc 1.73 3.77 10.00 20.00 5.71 20.00 11.79
   u23529C.asc 1.82 4.10 10.97 20.00 6.21 20.00 11.96
   u23529D.asc 1.73 3.79 10.14 20.00 5.62 20.00 11.80
   pus1112b.mxx 1.09 1.29 1.93 3.39 1.02 20.00 7.83
   pu1113ax.mca 1.09 1.30 1.93 3.33 1.03 20.00 7.83
   pu1113bx.mca 1.10 1.31 1.95 3.37 1.04 20.00 7.83
   vault01x.mca 2.03 5.02 12.18 20.00 3.86 20.00 12.06
   vault02x.mca 1.02 1.13 1.45 2.05 1.02 4.66 1.57
   vault03x.mca 1.80 3.79 7.74 11.70 4.39 20.00 9.49
   vault04x.mca 1.30 2.17 4.09 6.09 1.13 20.00 8.14
   vault05x.mca 1.46 2.72 5.86 11.24 1.30 20.00 9.06
   vault06x.mca 1.02 1.11 1.32 1.54 1.00 1.29 0.28
   vault07x.mca 1.80 5.24 20.00 20.00 1.54 20.00 13.55
   vault08x.mca 1.53 3.05 6.91 13.36 1.38 20.00 9.60
   vault09x.mca 1.50 3.01 6.74 12.32 1.56 20.00 9.37
   vault10x.mca 2.02 4.96 11.59 18.70 4.06 20.00 11.64
In this report we developed the techniques necessary to make such spectral comparisons
and described their application.
If a spectrum is treated as a random variable with a characteristic distribution and/or as
an n-dimensional vector with an associated magnitude and direction, then a set of
“comparators” can be calculated which are theoretically unique to each spectrum.  These
comparators can then be used to characterize the radiation source and determine whether
or not the source material has been altered.
Using these ideas, we reported on an inventory confirmation “proof of principle”
exercise where we went to a real nuclear-material repository and used a small, and very
portable, room-temperature CdTe detector to carry out a mock confirmation protocol.
The results suggest that this system can become the basis for an instrument that can non-
invasively confirm or deny changes in special nuclear material inventories.
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Appendix A
We previously pointed out that “the detector must be identically positioned relative to
the container for subsequent confirmatory measurements.”  In fact, it is likely that the
technique is quite robust relative to small errors in probe positioning relative to the point
where the original fiducial measurement is done.  This can be seen most clearly by
reference to Eqn. (4).  The normalization which transforms the spectrum into a
probability distribution also approximately normalizes the spectrum’s 1/R2 dependence.
For an ideal point source - viewed by a point detector - , this is rigorously true because
count rate variations would only be caused by 1/R2 dependence.
The idealized situation described above can be shown in the following way.  First, if f(xi)
represents the counts recorded in channel xi in time t, this is because the radioactive
source has actually emitted a total of y(xi) quanta that could have been registered in
channel xi .  These two quantities are related through
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where R is the source detector distance and f& is the absolute count rate of the source .
Consider now the same ideal source but counted at a new distance S and for a time t’,
where t’ ≠ t and S ≠ R, then
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and where we have assumed that the absolute disintegration rate of the source, if&, has
not changed over the course of the measurement.   Rewriting Eqn. (4) and showing the
normalization explicitly, we have after substituting Eqn. (9):
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One notes that if we began with Eqn. (10), the same result would be obtained, which
proves the relative independence of detector positioning under idealized conditions.  In a
real case, cancellation of the 1/R2 effects are energy dependent and can vary strongly
with source size and details of the packing.  The extent to which these effects cancel
would need to be evaluated on a case by case basis.
For the present report we simulated a thin, disc source packed into a stainless steel
cylindrical container with the following dimensions: Diameter = 18”, height = 30” and
container walls 3/32” thick.   The disk was assumed to be 12” in diameter; it was placed
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at the center of the container with the areal face perpendicular to the major cylindrical
axis and was assumed to emit a gamma-ray spectrum represented by Figure 3A. We
calculated two simulated responses: The first with the detector in contact with the
container lid (source-detector separation a = 15”) and a second with the probe 5” above
the lid (source-detector separation a = 20”).  The detector response was calculated
through
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where R is the radius of the disc source, a is the source detector separation, m(xi) is the
energy dependent mass attenuation coefficient for stainless steel and t is the thickness of
the container lid.
From the recalculated detector responses, we compared the 1st, 2nd and 3rd moments as
given Eqn. (5) and found ~ 1% variation.  Recalling that the source-detector separation is
changed by almost 35%, this represents a remarkable insensitivity to that variable.
Unfortunately, this same insensitivity cannot be attributed to all the descriptors identified
in this report.  The count-rate descriptor in  Eqn. (8 ) will not be insensitive to the
source-detector separation.  This is because the spectral quantities are directly compared
and remain unnormalized.  In this case, because distance enters the equations as a
squared quantity, a 1% error in detector placement causes at least a 2% error in
comparing count rates.
In general, the exercise investigating the sensitivity of the confirmation protocol to
source-detector separation suggests that the technique should still be used with some
care.  We have, for example, not established sensitivity to source size and geometry, i.e
source shape.  However, we expect these to be second-order effects.  It is interesting that
for the five comparators considered here, only one appears overly sensitive to the
source-detector separation.
